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SWITCH HITTERS: HOW LEAGUE
INVOLVEMENT IN DAILY FANTASY SPORTS
COULD END THE PROHIBITION OF SPORTS
GAMBLING
ABSTRACT
Whether in the form of lotto tickets or casino table games, gambling is
legally permitted in some way in virtually every U.S. state. Yet, in all but a
handful of jurisdictions, federal law prohibits wagering on sporting events
or professional athletes in any form. Several economically challenged
states, particularly New Jersey, have been trying to authorize sports
gambling within their borders as a way to raise tax revenues and support
their local gambling industries. While these attempts have thus far been
unsuccessful, Daily Fantasy Sports have simultaneously experienced a
meteoric rise, becoming a multi-billion dollar industry. This Note examines
the legal framework governing sports gambling and the grey area in which
Dailey Fantasy Sports providers have been allowed to operate. It then
analyzes Daily Fantasy Sports legally and qualitatively, concluding that
they constitute a form of illegal sports gambling that has largely escaped
regulation. Particular emphasis is placed on the hypocritical role that the
major North American professional sports leagues have played in Daily
Fantasy Sports’ explosive growth, while they simultaneously oppose sports
gambling and fight in court to block any attempts for its legalization.
Finally, this Note presents professional sports league involvement in Daily
Fantasy Sports as an opportunity for states and the larger American
gambling industry to gain the political capital necessary to repeal the
federal sports gambling prohibition, and explores the rising tide of public
and political support toward legalized sports betting on a state piecemeal
basis.
INTRODUCTION
The American Gaming Association estimates that underground, illegal
sports betting is a $140 billion industry in the United States. In the state of
New Jersey, most forms of traditional casino gambling are legal, but, as in
nearly all states, wagering on sports in any form is federally prohibited.1
New Jersey’s gambling industry has long called for the legalization of
sports betting in order to bring this massive underground market out of the
shadows and into the mainstream. These calls have become much louder in
the last half decade, as New Jersey’s casinos and racetracks have
experienced a drastic economic decline and have failed to recover from the
1. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227
(1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)).
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Great Recession.2 New Jersey’s state government, which relies on
gambling-related tax revenue and has experienced its own economic
shortfalls in recent times, has responded by twice attempting to institute a
license-based system of sports gambling at casinos and racetracks, in 2012
and 2014.3 Both times, a group comprised of the National Football League
(NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball
(MLB), the National Hockey League (NHL), and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) (collectively, the Leagues) brought an action
seeking an injunction to stop New Jersey from implementing its plans.4 In
both cases, the court struck down the state’s proposed legislation as a
violation of the federal statutory prohibition on sports gambling.5
Separate from these events, but perhaps not quite independent, fantasy
sports and, more recently, Daily Fantasy Sports (DFS) have taken the nation
by storm.6 While these fantasy games began as an entertaining hobby to be
played with friends or coworkers, DFS has blurred the line between illegal
sports gambling and legal fantasy sports gaming. In fact, DFS shares many
similarities with illegal sports gambling, both in terms of legal definitions at
the state law level and the way the entities that offer the games operate as
they have grown. The popularity of DFS games has allowed a handful of
providers—particularly FanDuel and DraftKings—to become multi-billion
dollar companies, counting some of the Leagues that claim to oppose sports
gambling among their primary investors.7 Other Leagues and league
partners, while not going so far as to invest in DFS providers, have
nonetheless signed huge sponsorship deals with them or formed other
business relationships.8 The result is that these DFS operators have been
allowed to entrench themselves in a market, while others such as New
Jersey’s gambling industry have been left out in the cold.9 However, the
2. See Tina Griego, The Last Hand: The Epic Bust of Atlantic City’s Gambling Economy,
WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/9/23/the-
last-hand-the-epic-bust-of-atlantic-citys-gambling-economy; John Wolfson, America’s Casino-
Saturation Problem, NEW YORKER (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/Americas-casino-saturation-problem.
3. See Zachary Zagger, Despite Setback, Odds Still Favor National Sports Betting, LAW360
(Aug. 25, 2015, 9:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/695075/despite-setback-odds-still-
favor-national-sports-betting; Will Hobson, Everything You Need to Know About New Jersey’s
Pending High Stakes Sports Gambling Ruling, WASH. POST (July 1, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/07/01/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-new-jerseys-pending-high-stakes-sports-gambling-ruling/.
4. See Hobson, supra note 3.
5. See Zagger, supra note 3.
6. See Darren Heitner, The Hyper Growth of Daily Fantasy Sports is Going to Change Our





9. See Zagger, supra note 3.
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seeming hypocrisy of the Leagues’ involvement in DFS could create an
opportunity for the gambling industries in New Jersey and elsewhere to
succeed in their ultimate quest of repealing the federal sports gambling
prohibition, allowing states to regulate, and profit from, legalized sports
betting on a piecemeal basis.
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information on sports
gambling, both legal and illegal, in the United States, as well as traditional
fantasy sports, DFS, and the financial impact of all these activities and
industries. Part II discusses the statutory framework under which sports
gambling and fantasy games can or cannot operate and the attempts that
states have made to permit sports gambling within their borders, despite
federal prohibitions. Part III examines the nature of DFS and argues that
they constitute sports gambling under virtually any definition. Finally, Part
IV argues that the Leagues’ involvement in DFS presents an opportunity for
New Jersey and other interested states or industries to further undermine the
federal sports gambling prohibition. This opportunity has become
increasingly ripe, as some of the Leagues have now publicly changed their
positions about sports gambling in the first place. If New Jersey is able to
capitalize on this opportunity and move forward with legalizing sports
gambling, there will be an influx of income to both New Jersey’s struggling
casinos and racetracks and the state’s tax revenue.
I. BACKGROUND ON SPORTS GAMBLING AND FANTASY
SPORTS
Generally speaking, gambling is very popular in the United States, and
the business of gambling is booming. Nationally, casinos in thirty-nine
states “generate enough consumer demand to produce total [annual]
revenues of more than $81 billion.”10 Research conducted by Oxford
Economics estimates that the legal gambling industry in the United States
“[g]enerates nearly $240 billion annually in total economic impact.”11 The
industry also produces roughly $38 billion in gaming and gaming-related
tax revenue for local, state, and federal governments.12 Sports gambling, in
particular, is also extremely popular in the United States, but since the
activity is federally prohibited in all but a few states, the large majority of
sports betting transactions occur illegally, in what some call “the world’s
largest black market for sports betting.”13 An “estimated $80 billion to $380
10. This includes both commercial and tribal casinos. AM. GAMING ASS’N, WHEN GAMING





13. Will Hobson, Sports Gambling in U.S.: Too Prevalent to Remain Illegal?, WASH. POST
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/sports-gambling-in-us-too-prevalent-to-
remain-illegal/2015/02/27/f1088e4c
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billion” is wagered illegally on sports in the United States each year.14 The
phenomenon is not distinctly American by any means, and some other
jurisdictions embrace regulated sports gambling as part of their overall
legalized gambling scheme. In the United Kingdom, for example, where
sports betting is legal and widespread (with the top professional soccer
league even running a sports book), the government generated £1.7 billion
(more than $2.5 billion USD) in overall gambling tax revenue from 2012 to
2013.15 In addition, the U.K.’s gambling industry employs over 100,000
people and generates more than $9.6 billion USD in total revenue, close to
0.5 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product.16
In the United States, under federal legislation prohibiting sports
gambling, only four states—Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana—are
allowed to authorize any form of sports gambling within their borders.17
Nevada is “the only state that offers the full-range of legal sports wagering
for all of the major professional and collegiate sports.”18 Nearly $4 billion is
bet on sports legally annually in Las Vegas alone.19 In 1976, Delaware
implemented a limited sports betting scheme known as “Scoreboard,”
which included three games, all confined to betting on NFL games and
“parlay” or multi-game wagering.20 The state abandoned the scheme after
the 1976 season, but revived sports betting in 2009 in a similar limited
form.21 Under the current Delaware system, gamblers can only bet on NFL
games and only in parlay wagers—a form of betting where one bets on the
outcomes of at least three games per betting card and must correctly pick
them all to win.22 Betting under this Delaware scheme increased every year
from 2009 to 2013, when wagering reached an annual total of $31.5
million.23 In Oregon, from 1989 until 2007 (when it was repealed), the state
“operated a sports betting lottery called ‘Sports Action,’ which allowed
[individuals] to make parlay bets on NFL games.”24 In its first two years of
-b7d3-11e4-9423-f3d0a1ec335c_story.html.
14. Id. Estimates vary wildly. See Jordan Weissmann, Big Bucks or Bogus Betting Baloney?,
SLATE (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/11/a
dam_silver_says_there_s_400_billion_per_year_of_illegal_sports_betting.html.
15. See Heitner, supra note 6.
16. Id.
17. Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad
Bet for the States, 2 UNLVGAMING L.J. 281, 288–89 (2011).
18. Id. at 288.
19. Hobson, supra note 13.
20. See Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2009).
21. Meer, supra note 17, at 289.
22. Jeff Barker, Delaware’s NFL Betting Business is Booming – and Marylanders are
Noticing, BALT. SUN (Nov. 14, 2014, 11:56 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-
sports-betting-nfl-20141114-story.html.
23. Id. A “significant number” of bettors come from out-of-state, including many from
neighboring Pennsylvania and Maryland, further driving development in the gambling and
tourism industries. See id.
24. SeeMeer, supra note 17, at 288.
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operation, the Oregon Sports Action game “generated over $14.5 million in
gross revenue,” resulting in “more than $4.5 million in net profit for the
State.”25 Finally, Montana allows state-licensed sports pools and a few other
games, but sports gambling in the state is limited to those schemes only.26
Fantasy sports were traditionally not viewed as a form of sports
gambling. Fantasy sports have existed in the United States in some form
since the 1950s. However, in recent decades, the rise of the Internet and
Americans’ ever-increasing obsession with professional sports has launched
fantasy games into a mainstream hobby and true national pastime.27
Traditional fantasy sports leagues are comprised of regular fans, each of
which own and manage their own “team” in a particular sport.28 These
leagues most commonly consist of somewhere between eight and fourteen
teams, and the participants “draft” their individual teams, usually by
selecting a roster of players, either one at a time or in an auction format.29
Participants then compete and score points based on the actual
performances of their individual players in real-world sporting events.30
Fantasy sports games do not inherently require players to pay an entry fee
or to compete for prize money, and indeed the major traditional fantasy
sports companies (e.g., ESPN, Yahoo, Inc., and CBS) do not charge to play
their games, nor do they offer financial prizes to the winners.31 However,
because the leagues are comprised of private individuals, and often friends,
coworkers, or others who know each other, it is a simple and common
practice for players to organize their own entry fee requirements and prize
pools.32
The number of people engaged in fantasy sports has exploded
dramatically in recent years; the Fantasy Sports Trade Association estimates
that 56.8 million people in the United States and Canada aged twelve and
over played fantasy sports in 2015.33 Americans spend an estimated $800
million annually on all fantasy sports media products.34 In all, research
shows that fantasy sports comprise a $1.5 billion industry, with annual
growth of more than 10 percent.35 The traditional fantasy sports providers
25. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 11–12 (1991).
26. Meer, supra note 17, at 289.
27. See Michael Trippiedi, Note, Daily Fantasy Sports Leagues: Do You Have the Skill to Win
at These Games of Chance?, 5 UNLVGAMING L.J. 201, 204–06 (2014).
28. Id. at 207.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 207–08.
31. Leigh Steinberg, The Fantasy Football Explosion, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 8:07 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2014/08/29/the-fantasy-football-explosion/.
32. See David A. Palanzo, Non-Exempt But Unenforced: The Status of Fantasy Sports Under
the UIGEA, 1 SPORTS&ENT. L.J. 135, 135–36 (2011).
33. Heitner, supra note 6.
34. Steinberg, supra note 31.
35. Fantasy Sports Services in the U.S.: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD (May 2015),
http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/fantasy-sports-services.html.
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largely generate their huge profits from the sale of information (i.e., advice
and statistical analysis) and advertising from the enormous amount of web
traffic that fantasy sports generate.36 Research also shows that fantasy sports
create a $3 billion to $4 billion annual impact across the entire sports
industry.37
DFS leagues, a new form of fantasy sport games, have surged in
popularity in recent years due to “[their] rapid-fire play, near instant
gratification, simple rules, and, of course, the ability to win real money.”38
Instead of selecting players for an entire season like in traditional fantasy
sports, DFS games require individuals to choose a lineup for a single night
or week, while arranging the values of their players so as to stay under a
“salary cap.”39 Players can compete in one-on-one matches with their
friends, either for free or for a set entry fee, or can pay to join a one-day
league, with the winners taking home actual cash prizes offered by the
games’ operators.40 One leading DFS provider, FanDuel, says that it paid
out $500 million in cash prizes in 2014 alone, while its largest competitor,
DraftKings, paid out $200 million.41 Those two DFS providers are believed
to have paid out over a billion dollars to players in 2015.42
While only a small subset of traditional fantasy game players currently
play DFS, researchers estimate that DFS generated $3.4 billion in entry fees
in 2015, and this figure is expected to grow 41% annually, reaching $14.4
billion in 2020.43 As the market for DFS has exploded, the fantasy sports
providers have picked up millions of dollars in investments.44 In 2013, two-
year-old DraftKings closed a $24 million Series B round of funding only
six months after it closed a $7 million Series A round.45 In the same year,
FanDuel secured $11 million in investment.46 A third provider, DraftStreet,
36. Steinberg, supra note 31.
37. Stephen Dorman, The Fantasy Football Phenomenon, THE ACORN (Aug. 3, 2006),
http://www.theacorn.com/news/2006-08-03/Sports/076.html.





42. Heitner, supra note 6.
43. Id.; David Purdum, Congressional Subcommittee Examining Daily Fantasy, ESPN (May
10, 2016), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/15498648/congressional-subcommittee-examining-
daily-fantasy-sports.
44. See Davis, supra note 38.
45. Darren Heitner, $24 Million Investment in DraftKings Should Shake Up the Daily Fantasy
Sports Space, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2013, 11:59 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/11/26/daily-fantasy-sports-provider-draftkings-
secures-substantial-amount-of-series-b-funding/; Darren Heitner, Atlas Ventures Delivers $7
Million to Daily Fantasy Sports Provider DraftKings, Inc., FORBES (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/05/06/atlas-venture-delivers-7-million-to-daily-
fantasy-sports-provider-draftkings-inc/.
46. Darren Heitner, Fantasy Sports Service, FanDuel, Secures $11 Million Investment;
Includes Money from Comcast Ventures, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2013, 6:00 AM),
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received roughly $3 million in venture capital from 2010 through 2012.47
The investment growth has frenetically traced the staggering rise in
participation and revenues, with DraftKings and FanDuel together having
raised more than $735 million total to date in venture capital.48
II. THE STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON EXPANDING SPORTS
GAMBLING
In October 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA, the Act), a federal prohibition on sports gambling
with the purpose of curbing the activity throughout the United States.49
Congress largely justified PASPA on policy grounds; the prohibition was
necessary to “stem the growth of teenage gambling and protect the integrity
of sports.”50 The Leagues played an instrumental role in the initiation,
drafting, and eventual passage of PASPA, lobbying Congress to protect the
competitive integrity of their product.51 At the time PASPA was being
debated, however, in addition to the four states with some form of pre-
existing legalized sports betting, thirteen others were considering legislation
to authorize some form of state-sponsored sports gambling scheme, largely
as a revenue-generating device to combat mounting budget deficits.52
PASPA was, at least in part, a reaction and attempt to impede the spread of
sports betting to those thirteen states on the aforementioned policy
grounds.53 Recognizing the enormous potential financial impact of state-
sponsored sports wagering, Congress nevertheless felt that the revenue
benefit to the states was “not enough to justify the waste and destruction
attendant to the practice.”54




47. Peter Lauria, Become a Millionaire Playing Fantasy Football, BUZZFEED (Aug. 27, 2013,
9:30 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/peterlauria/become-a-millionaire-playing-fantasy-football.
48. Heitner, supra note 6.
49. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227
(1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)).
50. Sen. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Policy Concerns
Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETONHALL J. SPORT L. 5, 5 (1992).
51. The Leagues have long claimed to oppose sports gambling because of concern it would
expose the Leagues to corruption and potential game fixing, or even just the perception among the
public that such activities could occur. See Hobson, supra note 13; see also Michael McCann &
Will Green, New Jersey Sports Wagering Hopes Facing Uphill Climb After Hearing, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.si.com/nfl/2016/02/17/new-jersey-sports-betting-
hearing-chris-christie.
52. Bradley, supra note 50, at 8.
53. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
54. Bradley, supra note 50, at 6.
55. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (2012).
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“sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license or authorize . . . a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on
one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate . . . or on one or more performances of such athletes in such
games.”56
PASPA specifically provides for injunctive relief to enjoin a state’s
violation (or proposed violation) of the statute, but only the Attorney
General of the United States or “a professional sports organization or
amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the
basis of such violation” are authorized to bring such a claim.57
PASPA also contains a grandfather clause, whereby states are allowed
to continue authorizing sports betting schemes that would otherwise
constitute a violation of the Act, so long as those games were authorized by
the state and actually existed prior to the Act’s enactment.58 The states to
benefit from this exception are Delaware, Oregon, Montana, and Nevada,
with Nevada having the most expansive sports gambling scheme in
operation prior to PASPA’s passage.59 The legislative history shows the
decision to include this exemption was largely economic: these states,
particularly Nevada, derived significant revenue from state-sponsored
sports gambling in the form of taxation and local business development,
and thus forcing these states to eliminate the schemes would “work a harsh
result.”60
Following the passage of PASPA, Congress passed the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006—a last-minute
attachment to the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act (SAFE
Port Act), an unrelated bill to improve the security of U.S. ports.61 Like
with PASPA, the Leagues lobbied aggressively for the UIGEA and were
instrumental in its passage.62 Noting that the development of technology,
specifically the Internet, had altered the gambling landscape in this country,
Congress sought to clear up the many uncertainties and grey areas that
existed in the online gaming regulatory system.63 The UIGEA attempts to
do this in two ways. First, the UIGEA prohibits any person “engaged in the
business of betting or wagering [from] knowingly accept[ing][a financial
56. Id. § 3702.
57. Id. § 3703.
58. See id. § 3704.
59. James C. W. Goodall, Note, Bringing Down the House: An Examination of the Law and
Policy Underpinning the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 67 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1097, 1108 (2015); Meer, supra note 17, at 287–89.
60. Bradley, supra note 50, at 9–10.
61. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367 (2012)); Meer, supra note 17, at 292.
62. Joe Falchetti, UIGEA, 6 Years Later, CALVINAYRE (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://calvinayre.com/2012/10/15/business/unlawful-internet-gambling-enforcement-act-2006/.
63. Meer, supra note 17, at 292.
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transaction], in connection with the participation of another person in
unlawful Internet gambling.”64 Second, the UIGEA requires U.S. financial
institutions, such as banks and credit card companies, to prohibit funding to
unlawful Internet gambling. This may be accomplished “through the
establishment of policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify
and block or otherwise prevent or prohibit the acceptance of restricted
transactions.”65 Thus, the UIGEA essentially makes it illegal for
individuals, businesses, and financial institutions to receive funds or credit
transfers related to unlawful Internet gambling.66 In the area of sports
betting, unlawful Internet gambling constitutes, at the very least, a
transaction originating in one of the forty-six states not granted an
exemption from PASPA.67
Crucially, the UIGEA makes an explicit, carved-out exception for
fantasy sports games, at least ones that meet certain requirements.68
According to the UIGEA, the definition of “bet or wager” does not include
“participation in any fantasy or simulation sports game or educational game
or contest in which . . . no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the
current membership of an actual team that is a member of an amateur or
professional sports organization.”69 The UIGEA further requires: (1) that
the prizes offered are established and made known in advance of the game,
and that their value not be based on the number of participants;70 (2) that the
outcomes are based on the relative knowledge and skill of the participants,
and are determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results of the
performance of individuals in real-world sporting events;71 and (3) that the
outcomes are not based on the score, point-spread, or the performance of
any single real-world team or solely on the single performance of an
individual athlete in a real-world sporting event.72 Thus, the UIGEA
attempts to distinguish between games of skill and games of chance in
carving out the exception for fantasy sports games.73 While there is some
debate whether even the large majority of traditional fantasy sports games
64. 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2012).
65. Id. § 5364.
66. The UIGEA does not make it illegal for private citizens to attempt to send funds or make
any such transfers related to unlawful Internet gambling. Falchetti, supra note 62.
67. See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 580 F.3d 113,
177 (3d Cir. 2009)(“Whether the transaction . . . constitutes unlawful Internet gambling turns on
how the law of the state from which the bettor initiates the bet would treat that bet, i.e., if it is
illegal under that state’s law, it constitutes ‘unlawful Internet gambling’ under the Act”).
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(ix) (2012).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(I).
71. Id. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(II).
72. Id. § 5362(1)(E)(ix)(III).
73. Pete Brush, Too Easy to Play? Your Fantasy Game Might Be Illegal, LAW360 (July 24,
2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/675467/too-easy-to-play-your-fantasy-game-
might-be-illegal.
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meet the UIGEA’s requirements,74 both traditional fantasy and DFS
providers operate within this UIGEA carve-out.75
Despite the federal statutory scheme, some states have tried to
implement legalized sports gambling regimes, leading to several lengthy
and high profile legal battles. In May 2009, Governor Jack Markell of
Delaware signed into law legislation that legalized wagering on all sporting
events, “making it the only state other than Nevada where such betting
[was] allowed.”76 Markell believed that sports betting could generate up to
$30 million in gambling tax revenue77 and at least $52 million in total state
revenue in the first year—an influx of funds the state desperately needed, as
it was facing an estimated $800 million budget deficit at the height of the
Great Recession.78 Calling the scheme “a competitive advantage that’s
available to Delaware and not to other states,” Markell signed the bill at
Delaware Park, one of the state’s three racetrack-casinos that collectively
stood to benefit from the legalization of sports betting.79 Before the
legislation was set to take effect, however, the Leagues filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware, seeking inter alia,
a preliminary injunction enjoining Delaware state officials from
implementing its proposed gaming scheme.80 The Leagues based their claim
for relief on the ground that the officials’ actions amounted to “authorizing”
sports wagering in contravention of PASPA’s prohibitions.81 Although the
district court denied the Leagues’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted the plaintiffs
an expedited appeal and reversed the district court’s decision.82 The Third
Circuit held as a matter of law that the state’s intended legislation violated
PASPA and was therefore invalid.83 The court determined that, consistent
with PASPA’s grandfather clause, Delaware could go forward with a
limited sports betting scheme that mirrored the one it briefly put into place
in 1976, but the state was prohibited from offering any single-game
wagering or betting on any sporting events other than NFL games.84 In May
74. See Palanzo, supra note 32, at 135.
75. Brush, supra note 73.
76. Theo Emery, Delaware Legalizes Wagering on Sporting Events, N.Y. TIMES (May 15,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/us/16delaware.html?_r=0.
77. Memorandum from Jennifer W. Davis et al., to Hon. Ruth A. Minner, Governor, State of
Delaware, Sports Betting Report as per HJR 10 of the 144th Gen. Assem. 2 (Jan. 10, 2008),
http:finance.delaware.gov/publications/sportsbetting.pdf.
78. Emery, supra note 76.
79. See id.
80. See Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 296–97 (3d Cir. 2009).
81. See id.
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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2010, the United States Supreme Court denied Delaware’s petition for writ
of certiorari, leaving the court of appeals’ ruling in place.85
New Jersey was the next state to attempt to legalize sports gambling
despite the federal prohibition contained in PASPA and, like Delaware, was
economically motivated. For much of the 1980s and 90s, New Jersey’s
Atlantic City casinos were actually earning more than the casinos on the
Las Vegas strip, but ever since the 2008 financial crisis, New Jersey’s once
thriving legal gambling industry has experienced a steep economic
decline.86 In addition to the general nationwide downturn, the gambling
industry’s decline can also be attributed to increased competition from
neighboring states, as several northeastern states, such as Pennsylvania,
loosened their own (non-sports related) gambling prohibitions, ending New
Jersey’s decades-old regional “monopoly.”87 While gross gaming revenue
in the northeastern U.S. market increased from $9.5 billion in 2006 to $11.7
billion in 2013, Atlantic City’s share of that revenue fell from a total of $5.2
billion to $2.8 billion over the same period.88 Pennsylvania, meanwhile, saw
its gross gaming revenue rise sharply to $3.1 billion in 2013, more than
Atlantic City and second nationally behind Nevada.89 Almost two-thirds of
Pennsylvania’s gambling revenue comes from the eastern part of the state,
revenue that otherwise likely would have gone to Atlantic City if
Pennsylvania had not loosened its restrictions on gambling.90
It is not an exaggeration to say that the results for Atlantic City’s
economy have been drastic. Four casinos on the famed Atlantic City
boardwalk closed in 2014, including the Trump Plaza Hotel and Casino and
Revel, a $2.3 billion project that opened just two years prior.91 This lead to
thousands of layoffs and unemployment claims, many of the former
employees being local residents or nearby commuters.92 The state and local
governments have been equally affected. Atlantic City’s total assessed
property value fell more than $9 billion from $20.5 billion in 2010 to $11.3
billion in 2014, largely due to successful casino appeals for reassessments,
in a municipality that derives up to ninety percent of its budget from real
estate taxes.93
Following the Delaware case, a group of New Jersey interest groups
attempted to challenge the constitutionality of PASPA in Interactive Media
85. Delaware Loses Appeal On Betting, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/sports/04sp
ortsbriefs-delaware.html.
86. Wolfson, supra note 2.
87. Id.
88. New Jersey Gaming Summary, UNLV CENTER FORGAMING RESEARCH, http://gaming.unl
v.edu/abstract/nj_main.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); see also Griego, supra note 2.
89. Griego, supra note 2.
90. Id.
91. Wolfson, supra note 2.
92. Griego, supra note 2.
93. Id.
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Entertainment & Gaming Association v. Holder.94 The plaintiff group was
comprised of the Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association, a
New Jersey nonprofit corporation, three New Jersey “Horseman’s
Associations,” which represented various members of the state’s
horseracing industry, and New Jersey State Senators Raymond J. Lesniak
and Stephen M. Sweeney.95 By letter, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
declined to intervene in the action filed in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.96 The plaintiffs made three major substantive
arguments challenging PASPA’s constitutionality: (1) that Congress’s
enactment of PASPA exceeded its Commerce Clause power because
Congress did not legislate uniformly among the several states as required;
(2) that PASPA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Act allows citizens in four states to “enjoy the
privilege of engaging in multiple forms and platforms for Sports Betting
and Sports Betting in general,” while citizens from the remaining forty-six
states are prohibited from enjoying the same privilege; and (3) that PASPA
violated the Tenth Amendment by handing the federal government “express
and implied reserved powers to the individual states to regulate matters
affecting its citizens including the raising of revenue by means of a form of
authorized Sports Betting.”97 However, the district court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, finding that none of
the plaintiffs satisfied the injury and redressability requirements for
standing.98 The court added that the state of New Jersey would be the
appropriate party to challenge PASPA’s constitutionality on Tenth
Amendment grounds.99
In December 2010, the New Jersey Legislature got involved, seeking to
provide “a potential economic lifeline to our casino and racetrack
industries.”100 While the Interactive Media litigation was pending, the
Legislature proposed a voter referendum on a state constitutional
amendment that would authorize it to legalize sports betting at the state’s
casinos and horse racetracks.101 After the amendment passed with 64
94. See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-1301(GEB), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23383 (D. N.J. Mar. 7, 2011).
95. Id. at *2–3.
96. Id. at *3.
97. Complaint & Demand for Declaratory Relief at 18–23, 26–27, Interactive Media Entm’t &
Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-1301(GEB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383 (D. N.J. Mar. 7,
2011).
98. See Interactive Media, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383.
99. See id.
100. Jeannie O’Sullivan, Rematch Possible In Fight Over NJ Sports Betting Law, LAW360
(Aug. 25, 2015, 10:15 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/695240/rematch-possible-in-fight-
over-nj-sports-betting-law.
101. Christopher L. Soriano, The Efforts to Legalize Sports Betting in New Jersey – A History,
N.J. LAWYER 22, 24 (2013), http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/soriano_njlawyer_0413.p
df.
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percent of the vote in the November 2011 general election, the Legislature
proceeded to amend the Casino Control Act to authorize a license-based
sports betting system at casinos and racetracks (the Sports Wagering
Law).102 The state’s Division of Gaming Enforcement and Racing
Commission was given power to approve license applications for sports
betting, with the exception that wagers continued to be prohibited on any
college sporting events taking place in New Jersey, or any games involving
a college team from the state.103
As New Jersey prepared to implement its new sports gambling
legislation, the Leagues, as they had in Delaware, attempted to block the
state’s efforts by filing suit in the district court in August 2012.104 In
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Governor of New Jersey
(Christie I), the Leagues (and the United States as an intervening plaintiff)
sought to enjoin the New Jersey state government from implementing the
Sports Wagering Law on the grounds that the legislation violated
PASPA.105 The state moved to dismiss, claiming the Leagues lacked
standing to bring the action and their claim failed on the merits, arguing that
PASPA is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Due Process
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.106 The
district court concluded that the Leagues had standing, and later upheld
PASPA’s constitutionality, granting summary judgment to the Leagues and
enjoining New Jersey from implementing the Sports Wagering Law.107
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s rulings on the Leagues’ standing, PASPA’s
constitutionality, and the injunction against the state in a 2-1 decision
handed down in September 2013.108 In arguing PASPA’s
unconstitutionality, the state focused on the Act’s alleged violation of the
“anti-commandeering” principle of the Tenth Amendment, which “bars
Congress from conscripting the states into doing the work of federal
officials.”109 New Jersey claimed PASPA’s mandate that states maintain a
ban on sports betting required the state to actively effectuate the federal
legislation, a clear example of legislative commandeering, according to the
state.110 The Third Circuit found no such violation, however, determining
“there is nothing . . . to suggest that the [anti-commandeering] principle is
meant to apply when a law merely operates via the Supremacy Clause to
102. Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to -4 (West 2012) (repealed 2014).
103. Soriano, supra note 101, at 24.
104. See NCAA v. Governor of N.J. (Christie I), 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
105. Soriano, supra note 101, at 24.
106. Id.
107. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 217.
108. Id. at 240–41.
109. Id. at 227.
110. Goodall, supra note 59, at 1118–19.
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invalidate contrary state action.”111 Lacking any affirmative command that
the states enact or carry out a federal scheme, PASPA, according to the
court, only stops the states from doing something, and therefore does not
violate the anti-commandeering principle.112
Additionally, New Jersey argued that PASPA violates the equal
sovereignty of the states by “singling out Nevada for preferential treatment
and allowing only that state to maintain broad state-sponsored gambling.”113
Rejecting a “one-size-fits-all test for equal sovereignty analysis,” the court
held that laws which treat states differently in order to combat “local evils”
such as gambling are “but one of the types of cases in which a departure
from the equal sovereignty principle is permitted.”114 Following the Third
Circuit’s decision, New Jersey petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari, but the Court declined to take the state’s appeal in
June 2014.115
Bearing in mind the lessons of Christie I, the New Jersey Legislature
made a second attempt to implement sports gambling in 2014, this time
partially repealing the state’s existing sports gambling prohibitions (the
2014 Law).116 By almost “completely deregulat[ing] private sports
wagering” in the state, the legislature believed it could allow sports
gambling without violating PASPA, as the Third Circuit interpreted the Act
in Christie I.117 Not surprisingly, the Leagues once again brought suit
against New Jersey in district court, seeking to enjoin it from giving effect
to the 2014 Law.118 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the state, holding
that a partial repeal of gambling legislation amounts to an authorization of
sports wagering in violation of PASPA (Christie II).119
On appeal, New Jersey continued to argue that the 2014 Law complied
with PASPA and, as a repeal of gambling legislation and not an affirmative
act, was consistent with Christie I.120 The Third Circuit rejected the
argument, because the partial repeal only allowed sports betting to take
place at casinos and racetracks, while leaving in place sports gambling
111. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 237.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 238–39.
115. Goodall, supra note 59, at 1127–29.
116. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-7 to -9 (West 2012), invalidated by Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015); NCAA v. Governor of N.J.
(Christie II), 799 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2015).
117. Goodall, supra note 59, at 1131–32; Martin Bricketto, NJ Sports Betting Law Struck Down
By 3rd Circ., LAW360 (Aug. 25, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/684051/nj-
sports-betting-law-struck-down-by-3rd-circ.
118. Christie II, 799 F.3d at 263.
119. Id. at 263–64.
120. Id. at 264.
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prohibitions everywhere else.121 The court noted this was “not a situation
where there are no laws governing sports gambling in New Jersey,” and
therefore the 2014 Law violated PASPA by providing authorization “for
conduct that is otherwise clearly and completely legally prohibited.”122
Thus, despite the suggestion in Christie I that New Jersey could repeal its
sports betting laws without violating PASPA, the court in Christie II
switched positions, finding that the partial repeal amounted to an
authorization of sports betting in violation of the federal legislation.
However, the court conceded that, had the 2014 Law repealed all
prohibitions on sports gambling, given Christie I, it would be difficult to
find that the state “authorized” sports betting in violation of PASPA.123
The state also made an interesting additional argument, though one that
the court of appeals ultimately rejected as well. The state claimed that the
district court erred in granting injunctive relief to the Leagues because the
Leagues had unclean hands, a result of their hypocritically supporting sports
gambling in other contexts, such as holding events in places where sports
gambling is legal and “sanction[ing] and encourage[ing] fantasy sports
betting.”124 The court held, however, that such action is not
“unconscionable” and therefore “fail[s] to rise to the level required for
application of the unclean hands doctrine.”125
Similarly to Christie I, Christie II was a split panel, 2-1 decision in the
court of appeals.126 Interestingly, though, and surprising to some, the
dissenter in Christie II, Circuit Judge Julio M. Fuentes, was the author of
the majority opinion in the former case.127 Judge Fuentes disagreed with the
majority as to whether a partial appeal amounted to an “authorization,”
claiming the majority’s decision rested on a “false equivalence” between
the two.128 According to the dissent, a repeal, even a partial one, treats the
repealed statute “as if it never existed.”129 Judge Fuentes echoed his own
language from the majority decision in Christie I to argue that “the lack of
an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean it is affirmatively
authorized by law.”130
In September 2015, New Jersey requested an en banc rehearing of the
case by the Third Circuit, adopting the view of Judge Fuentes’s dissent and
arguing the majority’s opinion in Christie II was inconsistent with the
121. Id. at 265–66.
122. Id. at 266; see also Zagger, supra note 3.
123. Christie II, 799 F.3d at 266.
124. Id. at 268.
125. Id.
126. O’Sullivan, supra note 100.
127. See id.
128. Christie II, 799 F.3d at 269 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 269–70 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (quoting NCAA v. Governor of N.J. (Christie I), 730
F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir. 2013)).
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concept of “authorizing by law” defined in Christie I.131 Although en banc
rehearings are “extraordinarily rare,” the Third Circuit granted the state’s
request over the Leagues’ objections, vacating its previous decision and
agreeing to take another look at the issue.132 Oral arguments took place on
February 17, 2016 and the Third Circuit’s en banc decision is forthcoming
as of this writing.133 However, observers and commentators have noted that
the judges appeared skeptical toward New Jersey’s arguments, and the state
has a “steep hill to climb” to convince the Third Circuit to hold in its
favor.134 Whichever side loses could then attempt to appeal to the United
States Supreme Court for further review, prolonging the now years-old
litigation even further. The Supreme Court only accepts about 1 percent of
cases for review, however, and the lack of any circuit split makes it less
likely the Court will take the case.135
III. DFS GAMES ARE GAMBLING
As previously discussed, the UIGEA contains an explicit carve out for
fantasy sports games, which recognizes them as a game of skill, provided
that “winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the
participants.”136 DFS providers have operated within this federal exception
since their inception, believing that as a game of skill they do not constitute
gambling and are therefore legal. DFS providers maintain this argument
despite the fact that the legislation “was enacted at a time when season-long
fantasy sports matchups, not daily ones, were becoming popular.”137
Analysis of whether DFS falls within this exception must, however, be
conducted in the context of state law, which governs most gambling-related
regulations and determines whether a game is one of “skill” or “chance.”138
131. See Matthew Perlman, NJ Pols Say 3rd Circ. Contradicted Itself On Sports Betting,
LAW360 (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/700400/nj-pols-say-3rd-circ-
contradicted-itself-on-sports-betting.
132. Joe Drape, Appeals Court to Rehear New Jersey Sports Betting Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/sports/appeals-court-to-rehear-new-jersey-sports-betti
ng-case.html; see alsoMatthew Perlman, Leagues Urge 3rd Circ. Not to Rehear NJ Sports Betting
Case, LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/708974/leagues-urge-
3rd-circ-not-to-rehear-nj-sports-betting-case.
133. McCann & Green, supra note 51.
134. Id.; see also David Purdum, Judges Skeptical of New Jersey Sports Betting Bid, ESPN
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/14800849/chalk-leagues-appear-upper-hand-
new-jersey-sports-betting-case.
135. McCann & Green, supra note 51.
136. Zachary Zagger, Outlook for Fantasy Sports Murky Amid Increased Scrutiny, LAW360
(Sept. 18, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704086/outlook-for-fantasy-sports-
murky-amid-increased-scrutiny.
137. Kimberly Pierceall, Q&A: A Look at How Daily Fantasy Sports Websites Operate,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 16, 2015, 11:37 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b0c7a72a3d46405
7912b118bbf61ee01/qa-look-how-daily-fantasy-sports-websites-operate.
138. David O. Klein, Fantasy Sports: The Rapidly Developing Legal Framework, LAW360
(Sept. 20, 2015, 10:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704275/fantasy-sports-the-rapidly-
developing-legal-framework; see also Dustin Gouker, Daily Fantasy Sports Sites Say Their Users
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States vary in their treatment of the chance or skill division, resulting in a
patchwork legal framework.139
In the majority of states, the standard for whether a game is one of skill
or chance is the “Dominant Element Test.”140 Under this predominant test,
the issue of “the character of the game is not whether it contains an element
of chance or an element of skill, but which is the dominating element that
determines the result of the game.”141 Whether an activity constitutes
gambling depends on the answers to two questions: (1) “[i]s the result of an
activity separable from the element of chance, so that skills can be
determinative, at least in some cases?”; and (2) “is the result always
sufficiently affected by the operation of chance that chance could always
account for the result?”142 Although the Dominant Element Test has been
adopted in a majority of states, the analysis is further complicated by the
fact that courts and legislatures among the states disagree on how to apply
it, meaning there is “no clear consistency in how states treat activities . . .
even when it comes to the same game.”143 A minority of states use the
conservative “Any Chance Test,” under which wagering on a game that
contains any element of chance, however small, is always prohibited as
gambling.144 This minority includes states such as Arizona, Iowa,
Louisiana, North Dakota, Vermont, and Washington.145
A few states have dealt with the legality of fantasy sports explicitly.
Montana has taken a unique approach and under its state law, “it is lawful
to conduct or participate in a fantasy sports league as long as no wagers take
place by either the telephone or Internet.”146 Montana therefore potentially
allows traditional, season-long fantasy sports leagues among friends, while
clearly prohibiting Internet-based DFS providers.147 In three other states—
Arizona, Florida, and Louisiana—the respective attorneys general have
examined fantasy sports and issued advisory opinions, each concluding that
Aren’t Gambling. They’re Wrong., WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/10/13/daily-fantasy-sports-sites-say-
their-users-arent-gambling-theyre-wrong/ (“The aforementioned carve-out from the 2006 federal
law paves the way for states to determine the legality of daily fantasy sports.”).
139. Klein, supra note 138.
140. Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-To-Play Daily Fantasy
Sports, 22 SPORTS L.J. 79, 96 (2015).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Dana L. Hooper, Outside the Lines: An Examination of the Legal Veracity of Fantasy
Sports As an Exception to Traditional Gambling Regulation, 1 SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 125
(2011); see also Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, Fantasy Sports: One Form of Mainstream
Wagering In the United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2007).
144. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 143, at 1205.
145. Klein, supra note 138.
146. Ehrman, supra note 140, at 100–01(citing MONT. CODEANN. § 23-5-802 (2011)).
147. Id. at 101.
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fantasy sports played for money are illegal games of chance.148 However,
these are merely persuasive authority and thereby nonbinding to courts.
Very recently, numerous other major states have noticed the explosion
in popularity of DFS and have begun to address the legal questions
underlying the billion-dollar industry. In October 2015, the Nevada Gaming
Control Board, in conjunction with the state Attorney General, issued a
notice declaring that DFS is a form of gambling under Nevada law, and, as
a result, DFS providers are required to be licensed with the Nevada Gaming
Commission and comply with the appropriate regulations.149 The regulators
ruled that DFS providers, such as DraftKings and FanDuel, must suspend
operations and cease from offering their games to Nevada residents until the
companies obtained the requisite licenses.150
Less than a month later, New York State Attorney General Eric T.
Schneiderman sent cease and desist letters to the major DFS providers,
telling them their games constituted illegal gambling under state law and
ordering them to stop accepting bets from New York residents.151 The
Attorney General followed up the letters by seeking an injunction in New
York state court to prohibit the DFS providers from operating in the state,
claiming the DFS games were “plainly illegal” and “nothing more than a
rebranding of sports betting.”152 The New York Attorney General’s action
in the area is particularly important to the nationwide treatment and
perception of DFS games for two reasons: First, New York is the DFS
industry’s largest market, containing 12.8 percent of all DFS users.153
Second, New York is where the headquarters of FanDuel, all the major
sports leagues, and many of the media companies and other investors that
have partnered with the DFS providers and powered their explosive growth,
are located.154 At least a dozen additional states have taken or are currently
considering legislative or executive action aimed at regulating DFS games
as gambling, including California, Illinois, Texas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
and Florida, with the list growing rapidly.155
148. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 143, at 1206.
149. Joe Drape, Nevada Says It Will Treat Daily Fantasy Sports Sites as Gambling, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/sports/gambling-regulators-block-daily-fant
asy-sites-in-nevada.html.
150. Id.
151. Walt Bogdanich, Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Attorney General Tells DraftKings
and FanDuel to Stop Taking Entries in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-york-attorney-
general-tells-fantasy-sites-to-stop-taking-bets-in-new-york.html; Joe Drape, End Sought to
Fantasy Sites in New York; Yahoo Is Said to Be Added to Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-york-attorney-
general-injunction.html [hereinafter Drape, End Sought to Fantasy Sites].
152. Drape, End Sought to Fantasy Sites, supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Alexandra Berzon & Sharon Terlep, Fantasy Sports Trade Association Gets Subpoena
From U.S. Prosecutor, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 7:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fantas
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As a result of the preceding state actions, the major DFS providers
currently prohibit the residents of seven states from participating in their
games: Arizona, Iowa, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, and
Washington.156 The recent trend of states, especially states employing the
Dominant Element Test, to regulate DFS supports the argument that DFS
games constitute gambling everywhere in the United States, regardless of
which test for gambling a particular state has adopted. This is because DFS
games cannot be rationally understood as anything other than games
predominated by chance. Expert players can put together what appears to be
an optimal lineup, but with a couple of unlucky bounces or untimely
injuries, even the best roster of fantasy players can lose. As one legal
commentator has noted, “an amateur chess player will likely never beat a
grandmaster; a hastily constructed fantasy lineup will beat a pro’s lineup
some percentage of the time.”157
DFS games resemble traditional gambling in numerous ways that
suggest they are, and should be treated, the same. Even though DFS games
do not involve wagering directly on the outcomes of any games, the choices
that its participants make look similar to the “prop” bets that sports books
usually offer on many facets of individual games, including the statistical
performances of individual players.158 Also, similar to traditional casino
gambling, “[a] vast majority of [DFS] players are net losers, losing far more
money playing on the sites than they win.”159 DraftKings’ data shows that
“89.3 percent of [its] players had an overall negative return on investment
across 2013 and 2014.”160 According to other data, in the first half of the
2015 MLB season, 91 percent of DFS player profits were won by just 1.3
percent of players.161 This disparity leads to the conclusion that DFS games
may have taken on a different set of characteristics common to unregulated
or illicit sports gambling enterprises (and even some legal ones), namely
corruption.
y-sports-trade-association-gets-subpoena-from-u-s-prosecutor-1445030125; Joe Drape, Illinois
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note 138; Zagger, supra note 136.
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er.io/fantasy-football-favors-the-sharks-heavily-over-the-fish-2015-9.
624 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 10
Allegations have swirled regarding predatory tactics and questionable
use of insider information by DFS providers and their employees, leading
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to open an inquiry into the
companies’ practices.162 The FBI became involved shortly after a scandal in
which a DraftKings employee admitted on a fantasy sports message board
that he had prematurely released sensitive data about the site’s biggest
contest and, the same week, won $350,000 by playing on rival FanDuel’s
site.163 Although both companies claimed the employee received no
additional advantage over other players as a result of the data, they both
quickly banned their employees from playing DFS games on any site.164
The scandal has led to the filing of numerous class action lawsuits by
players against the major DFS providers and heightened calls from federal
lawmakers to regulate DFS providers as illegal (or at least unlicensed)
sports gambling entities.165 The allegations make sense within the model of
the “shark and fish” theory discussed above, where DFS providers “need a
lot of people to play – even for a little bit of money – in order to pay out big
prizes which, in theory, entice people to keep playing,” but which in reality
are won by a small minority of players.166
DFS providers have referred to the gambling nature of their own games
in numerous contexts. In filing for an injunction against the major DFS
providers, the New York Attorney General’s office alleged that FanDuel
told an early investor that its target market is the male sports fan who
cannot “gamble online legally,” while DraftKings’ CEO had called DFS a
“mash-up between poker and fantasy sports” with a revenue model
“identical to a casino.”167 Moreover, these companies have embedded
gambling keywords into the programming code for their websites to drive
traffic from people looking to gamble on search engines.168 DFS providers
162. See Berzon & Terlep, supra note 155; Drape, supra note 149.
163. Berzon & Terlep, supra note 155.
164. Matthew Perlman, FanDuel Bans Employees From Fantasy Play, Opens Review, LAW360
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have also acknowledged their own gambling nature when seeking to expand
their operations into jurisdictions outside the United States and Canada.169
For example, DraftKings has applied for, and received a gaming license to,
operate in Britain, where sports gambling is legal, heavily regulated, and
extremely popular.170
The fact that DFS providers have formed explicit ties with other
gambling entities further undermines the claim that DFS is not itself a form
of sports gambling. Some online gambling companies have invested in the
major DFS providers, engaging in cross-promotion arrangements as well.171
Both FanDuel and DraftKings have recruited and hired senior executives
who came from online gambling companies or were professional poker
players.172 DFS providers have also borrowed a classic sponsorship strategy
from their online poker cousins, hiring rosters of “celebrity endorsers” who
are professional or semi-professional fantasy players, along with
showcasing DFS success stories.173 DFS providers then put their enormous
advertising budgets to use, “bombarding television and the internet with
[inspirational] ‘this man turned $50 into $31,000 in three weeks’ tales.”174
Many of these sponsored players use complicated computer programs and
algorithms that give them a significant advantage over other players; these
“professionals” are some of the very same “shark bettors” that casual
players complain about in lawsuits against DFS providers.175 Overall,
despite the frantic claims of DFS providers who suddenly find themselves
under fire, these games blur the line between fantasy sports and gambling
and thereby make the distinction unworkable. What once was considered a
grey area of legal uncertainty has quickly, and increasingly, been exposed
for what it is—a form of sports gambling that should be regulated if it is to
remain legal.
IV. UNCLEAN HANDS AND THE FUTURE OF PASPA
Experts have noted that the real winners from the courts’ rulings in
Christie I and Christie II are the DFS providers, which “can continue to
entrench [themselves] without competition from legalized sports betting.”176
When the Third Circuit renders its en banc decision in Christie II, before
169. Gouker, supra note 138.
170. Id.
171. Bogdanich, Drape & Williams, supra note 151.
172. Id.
173. Davis, supra note 38.
174. Id. According to one analyst, DraftKings and FanDuel likely spent a combined $150
million on TV and Internet advertising in the third quarter of 2015 alone, which included the
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the overall TV advertising growth numbers for the fiscal quarter. Udland, supra note 166.
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(Oct. 8, 2015, 9:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712738/draftkings-fanduel-hit-with-
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even reaching the merits of whether a partial repeal of sports betting legally
counts as an authorization of sports wagering in violation of PASPA, the
state of New Jersey, and the economic interests it represents, will have a
much stronger hypocrisy argument than it did in its previous actions. New
Jersey can and should now argue that the Leagues are acting with unclean
hands in seeking equitable relief. Far from merely hosting sporting events
in jurisdictions that allow sports betting, the Leagues have all, to varying
degrees, intertwined themselves with and supported DFS providers. DFS
providers are increasingly and forcefully being recognized at the state and
federal levels for what they are: a form of sports gambling that has managed
to escape regulation. MLB, the NBA, the NHL, and Major League Soccer
(MLS) are all investors in DFS providers, as are many of the Leagues’
largest media partners, such as Comcast, NBC, and Fox Sports.177 While the
NFL is not a direct investor, nearly every one of its teams has a sponsorship
deal with DraftKings or FanDuel, and “two powerful [team] owners – Jerry
Jones of the Dallas Cowboys and Robert K. Kraft of the New England
Patriots – have equity stakes in the companies.”178 One legal commentator
specializing in gambling and sports law has noted, “[t]he irony is that the
N.F.L. and other leagues are filing against New Jersey while at the same
time . . . supporting daily fantasy . . . . If they maintain the suit in New
Jersey, it sure looks like they are trying to have it both ways.”179 This clear
hypocrisy, bordering on anti-competitive behavior, may be enough to defeat
the Leagues’ action and allow New Jersey to move forward with its own
sports gambling scheme.
Even if this argument is ultimately unsuccessful and the court once
again strikes down New Jersey’s proposal, it is still in the state’s and the
gambling industry’s best interest to publicize the idea that the Leagues are
acting with unclean hands as much as possible. DFS providers are under
intense scrutiny at the moment, and more and more states are currently
mandating DFS providers cease operations within their borders.180 One
potential step could be for New Jersey to join these other states in banning
DFS, or at least investigating publicly the connection between DFS and
sports gambling, although, realistically, it makes sense for New Jersey to
wait until the full conclusion of its Christie II litigation before undertaking
such action.181 Nonetheless, the Leagues may have reached a level of
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involvement that is too deep to simply abandon and sever their relationships
with DFS. Ultimately, this could push the Leagues to instead make a
complete change in position on sports gambling and side with New Jersey,
supporting the repeal of PASPA and the institutionalization of large scale
licensed and regulated sports wagering. Given how instrumental the
Leagues were in Congress’s original drafting and adoption of PASPA,
League support and lobbying efforts would likely go a long way in ending
the federal prohibition. By capitalizing on this opportunity, the gambling
industry, and states that seek to increase tax revenue through sports
gambling, could turn their most vociferous opponents into their most
powerful allies.
The likelihood of these events coming to pass is bolstered by another
recent development: some of the Leagues are already publicly indicating a
change of stance on the issue of sports gambling. In November 2014, NBA
Commissioner Adam Silver made waves when he wrote a New York Times
op-ed piece in which he argued that Congress should legalize regulated
sports betting in the United States, the first public stance of its kind to come
from a major North American professional sports league.182 Silver argued
that “[g]ambling has increasingly become a popular and accepted form of
entertainment in the United States,” and pointed to the “thriving
underground business that operates free from regulation or oversight” as
further support for his position that there is “an obvious appetite among
sports fans for a safe and legal way to wager on professional sporting
events.”183 Silver called on Congress to adopt a federal framework that
would allow states to authorize sports betting on a piecemeal, as-desired
basis, subject to strict regulatory requirements and technological safeguards
that, according to the Commissioner, should include: “mandatory
monitoring and reporting of unusual betting-line movements; a licensing
protocol to ensure betting operators are legitimate; minimum-age
verification measures, geo-blocking technology to ensure betting is
available only where it is legal; mechanisms to identify and exclude people
with gambling problems; and education about responsible gaming.”184 MLB
Commissioner Rob Manfred has also recently made statements in support
of sports betting that, “while more tempered than [Commissioner] Silver’s,
are still a stark departure from baseball’s long-held anti-betting stance.”185
Gouker, If New Jersey Wins Sports Betting Appeal, What Might Happen Next In U.S.?, LEGAL
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The Leagues are beginning to realize that they can leverage the public’s
interest in sports betting into higher ratings, more attention, and higher
revenues from the sale of complimentary and informational products, just
like they have by promoting and investing in fantasy sports.186 They are also
finding that successful regulatory schemes exist and can be implemented to
both ensure their cut of the profits and protect against game-fixing and
other threats to the competitive integrity of sporting events. In Nevada,
where the sports betting scheme is extensive, the Gaming Control Board—
the regulatory agency for gaming throughout the state—has long noted a
lack of any issues with local universities and professional teams, finding the
scandals usually happen in other states where gambling is illegal.187 Nevada
has also provided examples of how regulation can effectively weed out
corruption and other potential game fixing in sports. One such example
occurred in March 1994, when “Las Vegas casinos noticed more than $1
million pouring in on an Arizona State basketball game that normally
generated about $50,000 in gambling activity.”188 The casinos alerted the
FBI, which uncovered “a point-shaving scandal involving Arizona State
players, a campus bookie and gamblers from Chicago.”189 Leagues like the
NBA are also looking to Europe, where legalized sports betting is a
thriving, but closely watched, industry that is regulated like a stock market,
with irregular betting patterns being identified in order to maintain the
integrity of sporting events.190 The Leagues and/or regulators in states other
than Nevada can use these models to develop similar systems to protect
against corruption, while still expanding legalized sports gambling.
CONCLUSION
While traditional sports gambling remains an extremely popular, yet
illegal activity in the United States, DFS providers have carved out and
built a massive new type of sports gambling industry, entirely within the
grey confines of a legal loophole. The Leagues, hypocritically, have and
continue to intertwine themselves in this process. As the popularity of DFS
continues to rise, significant challenges to sports gambling legalization
remain contentious and extensive. Perhaps the biggest among them is the
“continued vehement opposition by the NFL, by far the league with the
most clout in Washington,” and to a lesser extent, the NCAA as well.191 The
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political tide is shifting, however, as state governments, the public, and
even the Leagues begin to understand just how much money can be made
from sports gambling that, despite being allegedly illegal, is already
reaching new and unprecedented levels of popularity. This shifting tide is
making it more likely than ever that PASPA, at least as it currently stands,
could soon be a prohibition of the past.192 DFS has presented a unique
opportunity to states like New Jersey who seek the political capital to repeal
PASPA, as “[i]t is not hard to discern why politicians can get behind
changing the law with these kind of tax revenues at stake for their
constituents . . . not to mention the campaign donations from all the people
and companies that could benefit from a change in the law.”193 The Leagues
are finally being forced to realize that this group includes them as well.
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